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Collective Bargaining Resulrs 
Douglas A. Smith 
The author of the following article discusses the relation-
ship between inflation and collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining cannot in a vacuum create inflationary wage 
increases. Rather, it is the interaction of mark-up or target-
return pricing and profit-based wage demands that sets off 
the spiral of discretionary increases in wages and priées. In 
the author's opinion, it would be necessary to strive for 
intelligent methods of reducing the conflict between good 
industrial relations and a stable price level or face the con-
séquences of the actions of those who seek to impose un-
workable controls on the collective bargaining System. 
This paper is primarily concerned with Part III of the Task Force 
Reportl entitled « Collective Bargaining and Other Public Policies ». 
Having been responsable for some of the background material for Part III, 
I hâve been asked to give my évaluation of that section of the Report. 
My gênerai view on the question of inflation is that during the past 
several years, it has constituted the single most pressing problem of 
économie policy. Therefore I regar-
ded as very important the goal of SMITH, Douglas A., University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont. 
I am particularly indebted to Professors Crispo and Montague for their advice and 
encouragement. They must, of course, be absolved from ail heresy that remains. 
1. Task Force on Labour Relations Canadian Industrial Relations, Ottawa, Queen's 
Printer, 1968, 250 pages. 
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the Task Force in Part III of determining the effect of collective bar-
gaining on inflation. The problem of arriving at policy proposais in this 
area was made more difficult because of the degree of professional dis-
agreement in the literature over the définition and significance of cost-
push inflation. Although the Report ultimately gave the subject an 
almost balanced treatment, I feel that the degree of professional dis-
agreement was overstated and a stronger weight was given to the extrême 
demand-pull position than was justified by published works. Référence 
to the Report will show that statements referring to any impact of 
collective bargaining on the price level are presented in language that 
is almost apologetic. I do not believe that any apology is needed for a 
position that collective bargaining and other institutional forces can hâve 
undesirable price level effects. 
The three explanations of inflation that are reasoned with sufficient 
generality to be termed théories are demand-pull, cost-push and structural 
or demand-shift inflation. The first should be almost irrelevant for this 
particular discussion because it is a truism that if inflation is entirely 
demand-pull, collective bargaining can hâve no independent effect. During 
periods of strong excess demand, priées and wages would be pulled up 
in the absence of both large corporations and strong unions. The problem 
that has recently beset most industrial countries is, however, différent. 
It involves price level increases of a persistent nature during periods of 
moderate or even déficient demand. An explanation for this phenomenon 
that involves the discretionary power of labour and management to 
produce results in the labour and product markets that départ from the 
compétitive model is termed cost-push inflation. 
To begin with, I will acknowledge the dangers of trying to identify the 
causes of a particular inflation through the use of tests that deal with broad 
macroeconomic aggregates alone. As Samuelson and Solow2 point out, 
statements attributing inflation to cost-push factors simply because aggre-
gate wage changes exceed aggregate productivity gains are obviously false. 
Such reasoning says nothing about why wages rose. Therefore, such pièces 
of information are virtually useless to ail but editorial writers. To effect-
ively differentiate cost-push from demand-pull factors, we require relatively 
objective and quantifiable measures of cost and demand which would then 
be related to actual changes in wages and priées. If priées and wages were 
2. P. A. SAMUELSON and R. M. SOLOW «Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflationary 
Policy » in American Economie Review, May 1960. 
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more related to cost than demand factors we would call the inflation cost-
push or vice-versa for demand-pull. The problem to date has been the lack 
of appropriate measures of cost and demand. 
In the report of the Task Force, the only attempt at such a measure 
can be seen in Table 13 which shows base rate changes compared with the 
unemployment rate for the years 1953 to 1967. Combinations such as a 
4.6% increase in base rates with an unemployment rate of 7% or 8.6% 
in base rates with unemployment of 4.1% do not appear, in my view, to 
be consistent with a view of inflation that stresses solely demand éléments. 
This does not mean that I attribute ail inflation to cost factors. In fact, the 
opposite is closer to being true. However, I believe that at various times 
collective bargaining and corporate pricing practices can exert an inde-
pendent upward push that can be harmful to the pursuit of price stability. 
In stating that collective bargaining should not be entirely absolved 
from responsibility for price level variations, I feel that it is quite im-
portant to emphasize that collective bargaining alone is not to blâme and 
that executives and editorial writers who equate cost-push with wage-
push and blâme it ail on trade unions do so because of a failure or a lack 
of désire to understand the subject. Collective bargaining cannot in a va-
cuum create inflationary wage increases. It must be reinforced by the 
ability of the corporation with which the union negotiates to pass on the 
wage increase in the form of a price increase. This must therefore be a 
sign of the power of the corporation to exercise discrétion in the product 
market. Otto Eckstein in his article « A Theory of the Wage-Price Pro-
cess in Modem Industry » 3 also makes this same point that it is not col-
lective bargaining per se that is the problem but rather it is the interac-
tion of mark-up or target-return pricing and profit-based wage demands 
that sets off the spiral of discretionary increases in wages and priées. Only 
if management has some degree of discrétion in allowing wage increases 
can collective bargaining gain wage increases that exceed those that would 
be determined by économie conditions. 
The fault that I find with the analysis of Part III of the Task Force 
Report is that it was sufficiently vague and compromising as to allow 
easy misinterpretation. I believe that the blâme for this lies with the Task 
Force because there was a tendency to treat the subject almost as a political 
rather than an économie issue. I feel that the literature on the subject (al-
though admittedly largely American) and the performance of wages and 
3. O. ECKSTEIN « A Theory of the Wage-Price Process in Modem Industry » in 
Review of Economie Studies, XXXI, n° 4, 1964. 
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priées in relation to demand conditions justifies less conditional statements 
on the subject. It is my considered opinion that very few economists would 
take the position that collective bargaining can hâve no influence on the 
price level. My view of the position of some of the strictly demand advo-
cates of the Task Force was that they felt that Milton Friedman repre-
sented the majority opinion of economists. Although a great economist, I 
believe that Friedman represents a polar extrême on this subject and his 
views should not be imputed to the majority. 
This brings us to the next problem in a discussion of inflation, that 
being the policy alternatives flowing out of our analysis of the causes of 
inflation. My reading of the Task Force Report is that institutional pres-
sures can hâve an impact on the price level at times and with many con-
ditions attached. In spite of the conditional tones, this is the inescapable 
conclusion because of the policy recommendations of the Task Force. 
They state that monetary and fiscal policies alone do not constitute a rea-
sonable solution. Therefore they cannot believe in pure demand inflation. 
A view that the tools of monetary and fiscal policies alone are not adéquate 
is not to say that monetary and fiscal policies are powerless against infla-
tion — to the contrary, I hâve every confidence that monetary and fiscal 
policies could stop anything short of a Brazilian hyper-inflation. But it is 
with the employment effects of such policies that I would be concerned. 
I fear the effects of unemployment more than those of inflation and 
it is for this reason that I feel constructive steps must be taken to keep 
priées reasonably stable. Without such action, it is only a matter of time 
until continued deflationary steps finally check inflation by generating a 
sufficiently large recession. For this reason, I am opposed to the use of 
monetary and fiscal policies alone and agrée with the Task Force when they 
urge the création of an Incomes and Costs Research Board (subsequently 
re-titled by the government). 
The next thorny question to be faced has to do with the actions that 
should be taken by the Priées and Incomes Commission. I agrée entirely 
with the position of the Task Force that the Commission should be granted 
the maximum possible degree of independence and that it should be em-
powered to subpoena whatever information it requires in its research work. 
Other than this, the Task Force is not explicit in what the Commission 
should do but it is explicit in what it should not do. Specifically, it should 
not be a purveyor of the dread wage-price guideposts. I am not entirely 
certain that I agrée with this for reasons that I will enumerate. 
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Wage-price guideposts as a technique of économie policy hâve corne 
in for much criticism particularly following their collapse in the United 
States. However the guideposts hâve also had their defenders, notably 
Ross, Solow and Eckstein and the most récent and comprehensive survey 
of the subject4 predicts their return. Evidence on the effectiveness of the 
guideposts is sparse but the limited évidence that does exist suggests that 
the guideposts did hâve some bénéficiai effect during the years that they 
were employed. The évidence of which I speak is an article by Perry5 
which tests the impact of the guideposts through an équation that predicted 
the wage increases that would hâve occurred without the guideposts and 
then compares thèse estimâtes with the actual figures. Perry's work was 
for the period 1962 (q.l) to 1966 (q.l) and for further confirmation, 
I hâve extended his analysis using later data so that we hâve a con-
tinuous séries from 1962 (q.l) to 1968 (q.3). The obvious rationale for 
extending the residuals (actual — estimated) to 1968 is to détermine if the 
pattern of the residuals continues négative after the termination of the 
guideposts thereby casting doubt on the results. Table 1 and Chart 1 show 
the régression residuals which are consistently négative during the guide-
posts era. Thèse data are based on Perry's 6 wage équation which is as 
follows. 
Wt = -4.313 + 0 . 3 6 7 0 ^ + 14.71 Î U ^ + 0.424Rt_1 + 0.796ARt 
(0.054) (2.188) (0.06$) (0.176) 
R2 = 0.870 
In this équation, Wt is the quarterly wage change, Ct_! is the lagged 
change in the CPI, Ut_j is the inverse of the unemployment rate, Rt_t is 
the logged value of corporate profits and A Rt is the quarterly first dif-
férence of R. Perry's wage équation was fitted for the period 1947-60 and 
is of sufficiently good fit that we would expect it to be accurate in the 
era of the guideposts. I would expect the residuals to lose significance 
by early 1967 which is close to the actual pattern. The residuals would 
stay significant after the mid-1966 failure of the guideposts with the Na-
tional Association of Machinists because restraint from earlier settlements 
would affect later settlements so that the guidepost impact would tail off 
with some type of distributed lag. This appears to be the case although I 
4. John SHEAHAN, The Wage-Price Guideposts, Washington, Brookings, 1967. 
5. G. L. PERRY, « Wages and the Guideposts » in American Economie Review, 
LVII, No 4, Sept. 1967. 
6. G. L. PERRY, Unemployment, Money Wage Rates and Inflation, Cambridge, 
M.I.T. Press, 1966. 
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TABLE 1 — ACTUAL MINUS ESTIMATED QUARTERLY WAGE CHANGE 
Year — Quarter Wa — We 
1 9 6 2 - 1 +0.84 
2 +0.07 
3 - 0 . 5 2 
4 - 0 . 7 1 
1963 - 1 - 0 . 9 7 
2 - 0 . 3 7 
3 - 0 . 1 9 
4 - 0 . 1 8 
1964 - 1 - 0 . 2 7 
2 - 0 . 7 7 
3 - 0 . 7 3 
4 - 1 . 7 2 
1965 - 1 - 1 . 6 8 
2 - 1 . 6 3 
3 - 2 . 1 1 
4 - 1 . 6 1 
1966 - 1 - 2 . 4 8 
2 - 2 . 7 7 
3 - 2 . 6 3 
4 - 2 . 3 6 
1967 - 1 - 1 . 5 4 
2 - 0 . 9 6 
3 - 0 . 5 3 
4 - 0 . 5 8 
1968 - 1 +0.26 
2 +0.09 
3 - 0 . 1 7 
SOURCE : 1962 ql to 1966 q l — Perry, op. ch., p. 899 
Later figures computed from data foi 1966-68. 
Chart 1 
Scatter Diaqram of Régression Residuals 
. 1962 q . l to 1968 q.3 
UIIIITT^I'III M M"H R4H4i I TI 4i4R~R~H44i4H4"H~H" H44H4i R H FK R' HH44I tTFHFR4HH4HRFFH4l4!f R R 
R 771 ! TPT11111 1 II T11771 M T l l 1 1 ' 1 M I M n T i l l M M 1 I M T R'1111111 l l M 11 "mTTTIT I I I f l M "• M l T l i M 11 t ! 
i ! 1111 j 1 I I 1 IJ 1 i ' 111 1 ! 111 ! 111 ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! 11 M I I 11 i l l M i l 11 M 1 I I 1 M 11 I I ! 11 M 111 M 11 I I 1111 M ! 1 M M i 
i « i * j j t | ] j ] j i j j ] | | 1 1 1 ' i l ' i ! j i i i ' j i i ! l i i l i i l i i f l l l i S i i i i i t t l l i i l i i î i l i l i 11 l l ' î l i i i i l i i i t i i l i i l i l i l i i 
l I I I I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 i M 1 M ! 1 • ' '• 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ' 1 1 ! 1 I I 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I 1 1 I I ! ! 1 1 i 1 1 1 M 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 M 1 ! 1 I 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ! M 1 1 1 I 1 ! 1 ! i i t | | ! M 1 ! 1 1 ! 1 1 ' 1 l i i 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 M 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 M 1 i M 1 1 i M I I I I I 1 1 1 M 1 1 I I 1 1 i 1 111 ' l i 1II II11 II 1 M 1 1 1 1 1 1 M M 1 1 1II1 1 I I 1 1 I I l 1 1 I I 1 1 I I I I 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 t I I I 1 1 ! 1 1 t 1 ! i ! 1 ! 1 1 ! I 1 ! ' 1 1 M": > M 11 1 1 1 71 1 lûtë M 1111 . I l T t"i \" 
" 1 M M " M l M HT ' 'U I l 1 M i • M M^M M M M M : <M -•• l M n M H M M M M M M M M M 1 M M M M M M ^ . M M | 1 M M M 
: I M ' j j t M i>v '|W ; ! 1 ' r 1 1 T " TT' l t t " I l t M 'M 3^I'f 1" ' 1T ITU 7 M M ' 1 ' 1 M 1 i M ' M i^i f\ I I 1 ! 1 1 ! 11 11 1 i ! 1 11 M i l 1 11 111 1 M 1 11 i ! ! 1 l 1 ' M i l 11 1 I I ' i ! 
I l M M ! ! I^J • M U M i' 1 1 r i M-Ji- J>1 j j j ; j ;QM ! j j1 f M 1 11 j i j 1 ' j 11 M 1 ' ^ i X i I 11 ] ! i i I M {! ! j ! 1 | | i ! | | M 1 1 I : yP T 1 1 ! 1 i 1 M M 1 M | /»*v •?* M 1 1 1 1 M 1 I I 1 I I I 1 1 11 I I 1 M 1 1 I I i ! 1 1 1 1 i i 1 1 i I I 1 1 i l i i M i 1 i i 1 i i 1 1 i 1 1 I I ! I 
4l74i777i T f t iHi j i -{+H-|4-j4j4-fH4f} H-( 4|44 i l m 4 i l H 4 F m4 14M t IM m 4R M H 44it 4M M I iil'i 4RR 
M I M M ! M ! M ' M M M I ! M M I h M M U I M M M R ! R R R M i | ! M 
1 M i U> /*> ; o 1 :Q 1 1 " 1 n i ' 1 M i M i Ml M r | i R R M i i M1 M S* M m M I R R M R Ml R R ' R : 
•.ni M I I 1 ! 1 1 i 1 M M 1 1 ! ! 1 i ! M M 1 M ! 1 M M 1 1 1 1 i l M 1 1 I t t 1 1 1 1 1 M 1 1 i ! I n i i n 1 1 î r i I M l I r r n I I ' i r, t H r • \ M i M ri"1 ' M h M i M i M M M 1 M i M \ ':<rî M M 1 i M ! i M i M • 11 l I 11 i I I 11 1 M h M i M M t l i rr*, T M M M M M M M ' i M 1 i M i 1 M M 1 i l M i 1 M M I 1 I U r LU i i i i M M ! M i M i I I M M i •• M M \r% \\\\\\t?fi 1 t h M 11M111 M M i l l ! 1 M M p-f m ' M M r M ! : M M M M M M i i L>M M M M M M i M M M M M i MJ/M/s T M 111 M M i M M M M X .MI M1 M M M M M M M n^ M M M M M M M ; 
I14141444-UU1444444+U441441414 lçiiii..i-M-i 
HrffWfitt!^^ M M M R M M M M M M M M M Mi M M M M: : M ' M ; M M M • M M M M M M M i 1 M M i l M 11111 i l M M " M 111 11 M I I I111 i l M l M i l 11 M • M M M M M M " • • i l 11 ''MM 
^ M i M M M M ; M ! M M i ! I l o 11II i l 1 11 11 11II11 1 I I 1 I I 1 [1 I I 111 1 | | | 1 i l l I I M 1 i i 111111 M l 11 M i ! 1 l i l i l 1 ! 1 i j M | M i i 1 ! ! ; M M M n i i M M i M 
~ 1962 ' 1963 ' 1964 ' 1965 ' 1966 ' 1967 * 1968 ' 
I ° 
IS 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RESULTS 53 
in no way mean to imply that I consider this to be conclusive évidence. 
As Perry puts it, however, this évidence does tend « to shift the burden of 
proof » to the seeptics. 
The question that this whole issue raises for industrial relations is 
whether there is a conflict between good industrial relations and satis-
factory wage-price performance. The récent Air Canada strike is probably 
a good illustration of the problem. I doubt that the strike would be termed 
an emergency except by those who view ail strikes in that light. Therefore, 
I feel that the action of the government in allowing a long strike was com-
mendable particularly in comparison with the « peace at any price » policy 
of its predecessor. Peaceful settlements are not a mark of good industrial 
relations if the settlement is based on the belief that the size of the wage 
increase doesn't particularly matter since it can be covered by a price 
increase. Government policy, as apparently exemplified by Air Canada, 
is to hâve some set of implicit norms. Enforcement is more difficult for 
private concerns yet sélective government policies in this area could be 
very effective. Since profit increases from 1963-1966 were a spur to large 
wage increases, taxes should be geared more selectively to prevent such 
destabilizing profit spurs. On the wage side, the government could let it 
be known that sélective tariff cuts would occur in sectors with large wage 
gains, thereby lowering management's wage ceiling. Industries with strong 
wage-price performance would be hard pressed to logically oppose such 
tariff cuts. This policy would not be identical to the U.S. guidepost ap-
proach, but to enforce it, the government would, at least implicitly, require 
some sort of guideposts. 
Thèse ideas are certainly not the only possibilities nor are they with-
out drawbacks. Yet, I feel that we must recognize the inevitability of such 
innovations in the future. Those of us whose primary interest is industrial 
relations may hâve to reshape some of our ideas with respect to normative 
techniques of dispute settlement if présent techniques continue to create un-
acceptable économie results. Labour specialists appear to greet such bodies 
as the new Priées and Incomes Commision with yawning distain instead 
of searching for ways to integrate its approaches into our présent industrial 
relations framework. I feel that the future will not allow us to continue that 
attitude. Measures to control wage-price performance are still in their 
early stages. We must strive for intelligent methods of reducing the con-
flict between good industrial relations and a stable price level or face the 
conséquences of the actions of those who seek to impose unworkable 
controls on the collective bargaining system. 
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CONSÉQUENCES DE LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Nous examinons dans cet exposé la troisième partie du Rapport de l'Équipe 
spécialisée en relations du travail intitulée : « Négociation collective et autres poli-
tiques gouvernementales ». Depuis ces dernières années, l'inflation constitue le pro-
blème le plus pressant à résoudre dans le domaine des politiques économiques. Un 
des buts majeurs de l'Équipe spécialisée était de déterminer à quel point la négo-
ciation collective pouvait être une cause d'inflation. 
Les spécialistes ne sont pas d'accord sur la définition et la signification exacte 
de l'inflation par les coûts. Le Rapport traite le problème d'une façon assez balancée, 
quoiqu'à notre avis, plus de poids que nécessaire fut donné à la position extrême 
de l'inflation par la demande. 
Le problème qui a récemment touché les pays industrialisés inclut des hausses 
du niveau des prix pendant des périodes où la demande est demeurée stable ou a 
même diminuée. Une explication de ce phénomène impliquant le pouvoir discré-
tionnaire des syndicats et des patrons d'obtenir des résultats sur le marché du tra-
vail et du produit en dehors du modèle compétitif, s'appelle l'inflation par les coûts. 
Si les prix et les salaires étaient davantage reliés aux coûts qu'à la demande, nous 
aurions une définition de l'inflation par les coûts, et vice-versa pour l'inflation par 
la demande. L'absence d'instruments appropriés qui pourraient mesurer les coûts 
et la demande constitue un problème encore aujourd'hui. 
Nous croyons qu'à diverses périodes la négociation collective et les politiques 
de prix des corporations pourraient exercer une poussée ascendante nuisible à la 
stabilité des prix. La négociation collective ne peut pas créer seule des hausses de 
salaires inflationnistes. Elle doit être accompagnée par ce pouvoir des corporations 
qui transfère le coût des augmentations de salaires au consommateur par la hausse 
des prix. Ce n'est pas la négociation collective en soi qui crée le problème. C'est plutôt 
cette interaction du retour aux salariés des coûts qu'ils provoquent et des demandes 
d'augmentations de salaires visant au profit qui produit le spirale de hausses discré-
tionnaires des salaires et des prix. 
Cette troisième partie nous semble suffisamment vague pour provoquer de fausses 
interprétations. Nous regrettons que l'Équipe spécialisée ait traité ce sujet comme 
s'il s'agissait d'un phénomène quasi politique, plutôt qu'un phénomène proprement 
économique. Mais nous craignons davantage les effets nocifs sur l'emploi que sur 
l'inflation : c'est pourquoi des mesures constructives doivent être prises pour assurer 
une stabilité relative des prix. L'utilisation de politiques monétaires et fiscales seu-
lement n'est pas suffisant ; nous appuyons l'Équipe spécialisée dans sa recomman-
dation de créer un Bureau de recherche sur les revenus et les coûts. 
